in European hospitals is hampered because of widespread asymptomatic carriage of VRE by healthy Europeans. In 2000, our hospital (The University Medical Center Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands) was confronted with a large outbreak of VRE.
Nosocomial outbreaks and bloodstream infections caused by vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium (VRE) are currently emerging in European hospitals [1, 2] , thereby mimicking the American VRE epidemiology in the 1990s. In contrast to the American situation, however, asymptomatic carriage of VRE in the nonhospitalized community is widespread in Europe [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . This has been attributed to the selective effects of avoparcin, a glycopeptide extensively used as a growth promoter in European agricultural industry. Use of avoparcin has never been permitted in the United States. In 1997, the European Union banned the use of avoparcin, and the prevalence of VRE in healthy humans has decreased since then [7, 8] .
In 2000, our hospital was, for the first time, confronted with a large nosocomial outbreak of VRE. At that time, ∼5% of nonhospitalized humans were considered to be VRE carriers [3] [4] [5] [6] . Therefore, an infection-control strategy based on active surveillance of VRE carriage, with implementation of barrier precautions for carriers, would require tremendous efforts and was deemed impossible. Instead, an alternative strategy based on molecular typing that distinguished a so-called epidemic genetic cluster was developed and imple-mented. The population structure of this epidemic strain, the duration of carriage, and the economic costs of the initial phase of the outbreak have been reported elsewhere [9] [10] [11] . Here, we report, in detail, on the efficacy of this genotyping-targeted infection-control approach.
PATIENTS AND METHODS
Setting. The University Medical Center Utrecht (Utrecht, The Netherlands) is a tertiary care hospital with 1042 beds; 6 intensive care units (ICUs), including 2 pediatric ICUs; and all medical specialties represented. Nephrology and gastroenterology patients receive care in a combined ward, which is designated the "NG ward."
Microbiology. Microbiological analysis of rectal swab specimens was performed as described elsewhere [10] . All VRE isolates underwent additional susceptibility testing for ampicillin and other antibiotics. Vancomycin-resistance genes (van genes) were detected by multiplex PCR [12] . All VRE isolates were genotyped by PFGE [13] . Clustering was analyzed with BioNumerics software, version 3.0 (Applied Maths), by using the unweighed pair-group method with arithmetic averages based on the Dice coefficient, with a 2% optimization and a 1% band-position tolerance. The degree of genetic variability was expressed as the Simpson's index of diversity, D [14, 15] . For this, isolates sharing 186.7% of their banding patterns (!3-band difference) were considered to belong to a single PFGE type. PFGE was performed once per week, with a turnaround time of ∼1 week for definite results. A subset of isolates, selected on the basis of differences in PFGE typing, were subjected to determination of the presence of the variant esp gene by PCR [16] .
Definitions. Patients colonized with an epidemic strain were labeled "epiVRE patients." Patients with prior hospitalization in the NG ward or medical ICU (MICU) were labeled "possibly epiVRE patients" until 3 consecutive rectal swab test results were negative for VRE. In the first month of the outbreak, epidemic strains were defined on the basis of PFGE clustering and epidemiological linkage, which was defined as the presence of at least 2 patients with similar VRE strains who were on a specific ward during overlapping time periods. Other genotypes were considered to be nonepidemic strains, and patients colonized with such strains were not labeled.
Index patients. In April 2000, a cluster of patients infected (urinary tract infection) and/or colonized with VRE was detected in a neighboring hospital, and 2 of the presumed index patients had been previously hospitalized in our hospital. VRE had not been isolated in clinical cultures during those hospital admissions.
Infection-control measures. The total outbreak period was retrospectively divided into 4 periods on the basis of on adaptations of the infection-control protocol resulting from evolving experience: the inventory period and periods I, II, and III (table 1) . In the inventory period (May 2000-June 2000), all patients still hospitalized who might have had contact with the 2 presumed index patients were screened for VRE colonization. Subsequently, screening was extended to all patients in wards where VRE transmission was considered likely. General hygienic procedures, such as hand disinfection with alcohol-based hand rubs (routinely used in our hospital since 1993), and restriction of vancomycin use were reinforced hospitalwide. Key elements of the infection-control policy were contact isolation precautions for all patients colonized with VRE (i.e., glove and gown use and treatment confined to a single room) and the cohorting of patients and nurses. Wards were temporarily closed to new admissions when spread of VRE was likely. After the first month, VRE strains were distinguished as epidemic or nonepidemic, and infection-control measures were only applied in the cases of epiVRE patients and possibly epiVRE patients.
In period I (June 2000-October 2000), wards where dissemination of VRE had been demonstrated were divided into 4 spatial cohorts (table 1) . Patients were cohorted, and the nursing staff was, as much as possible, connected to 1 cohort per shift. Rectal swab specimens for screening were obtained from all patients, 3 times weekly. All patients who had been hospitalized in the NG ward from January 2000 onward were asked to obtain 3 rectal swab specimens on 3 consecutive days and to return these to our laboratory.
After period I, the outbreak had been controlled in all but 2 wards, and cohorting was discontinued in most wards during period II (November 2000-June 2001). In the 2 affected wards (the NG ward and MICU), the number of cohorts was reduced to 3 (table 1). The cohort of possibly epiVRE patients contained all patients who had been hospitalized in the NG ward between January and November 2000, and they were treated in preemptive isolation, regardless of culture results. This change in policy was based on the appearance of VRE colonization after 3 negative culture results in possibly epiVRE patients. In both wards, rectal swab specimens were obtained from all patients, once per week.
In period III (July 2001-January 2003), only epiVRE patients remained subjected to contact isolation precautions, and the cohort of possibly epiVRE patients was discontinued. Surveillance frequency remained at once weekly until September 2001 and was reduced to once monthly thereafter.
Throughout the outbreak period (and thereafter), epiVRE patients were entered into the Hospital Information System, to enable immediate isolation precautions if readmitted. Carriage of nonepidemic VRE strains was not reported to the wards.
Community prevalence of VRE. Fecal samples (1 per patient) from 600 nonhospitalized patients in the Utrecht region who visited their general practitioner for gastrointestinal complaints in July and August 2000 were screened for VRE. Alcohol-based hand rub and antibiotic use. Annual amounts of alcohol-based hand rub solutions, ordered by and delivered to individual hospital wards, were registered by the Department of Clinical Pharmacy from 1997 onward and were measured in liters per 1000 patient-days. Data were analyzed for the most-affected wards (i.e., the NG ward, MICU, neurosurgical ward, and neurosurgical medium-care ward) and for 3 wards that had not harbored patients with epiVRE (the ophthalmology, hematology, and orthopedics wards) for the years 1997-2002. Annual antibiotic use (vancomycin, clindamycin, metronidazole, and cephalosporins), expressed as defined daily doses per 1000 patient-days, was determined for the most affected ward (the NG ward) from 1999 to 2003.
Statistical analysis. Relative risks for acquiring colonization in different study periods were calculated using SPSS software (SPSS Institute).
RESULTS
Description of the outbreak. During the inventory period (May-June 2000), initial screening of 183 patients yielded 27 patients colonized with VRE among 6 wards. None of these patients colonized with VRE developed severe infections. On the basis of comparison with a set of community-associated VRE strains of human or animal origin, 2 epidemic clusters and a group of sporadic isolates of VRE were distinguished. Cluster I was found in 19 patients (10.4% [95% CI, 6.4%-15.7%] of the 183 patients), cluster II in 6 patients (3.3% [95% CI, 1.2%-7%]), and sporadic isolates in 2 patients (1.1% [95% CI, 0.1%-3.9%]. All VRE isolates not belonging to clusters I and II were considered nonepidemic.
Evolution of the outbreak. There was evidence of patientto-patient transmission of epidemic VRE in 6 wards, which were temporarily closed for new admissions during 14 time periods (among the 6 wards) for a total of 133 days.
Period I (June-October 2000). During period I, 59 of 683 patients screened had VRE colonization: 24 (3.5% [95% CI, 2.2%-5.2%]) with nonepidemic isolates and 35 (5.1% [95% CI, 3.6%-7.1%]) with cluster I epidemic isolates (figure 1). Of these 35 patients, 25 (71%) were in the NG ward, 4 (11%) were in the MICU, 3 (9%) were in the neurosurgery ward, and 3 (9%) were in other wards. No new patients colonized with cluster II isolates were found. Overall, 318 discharged patients returned rectal swab specimens, and 3 of the patients were colonized with cluster I VRE. These 3 patients were thought to have acquired VRE in the NG ward. Eleven patients initially labeled as possibly epiVRE patients had 3 consecutive negative surveillance culture results and were, according to protocol, considered to be not colonized with epiVRE. However, colonization with cluster I VRE appeared in some patients hospitalized in the NG ward without an evident source from which cross-transmission could have occurred. From then on (period II), all patients who had been hospitalized in the NG ward or MICU since January 2000 ( ) were considered to be n p 700 possibly epiVRE patients, regardless of culture results, and were treated in preemptive isolation when admitted to the hospital.
Period II (November 2000-July 2001). During period II, 52 of 810 patients screened had VRE colonization: 28 (3.5% [95% CI, 2.2%-4.7%]) with cluster I isolates and 24 (3.0% [95% CI, 1.8%-4.1%]) with nonepidemic isolates (figure 1). Again, there were no new cases of colonization with cluster II isolates. Two groups of transmission of cluster I isolates (7 patients in 1 group and 8 in the other) occurred in the cohort of newly admitted patients. The remaining 13 acquisitions were demonstrated in the possibly epiVRE cohort, with no evidence of cross-transmission. The relative risk (RR) of being identified Figure 2 . Dendrogram containing PFGE patterns of 148 vancomycin-resistant enterococci isolates, determined using the Dice coefficient of similarity and clustering by the unweighed pair-group method with arithmetic averages. Three clusters were distinguished: a cluster of sporadic, nonepidemic isolates and the epidemic isolate clusters I and II. The number of isolates within each cluster and the percentage of similarity are shown. The genetic diversity (measured by Simpson's index of diversity, D) of isolates belonging to clusters I and II was 0.098 (95% CI, 0.007-0.189) and 0, respectively, whereas it was 0.781 (95% CI, 0.686-0.875) for sporadic isolates, which demonstrates that the nonepidemic isolates are genetically more diverse than the epidemic isolates. Isolates that were also typed by amplified fragment-length polymorphism (AFLP) are identified by an "x."
as a VRE carrier in period II, compared with period I, was 0.67 (95% CI, 0.41-1.10) for an epidemic strain and 0.84 (95% CI, 0.48-1.47) for nonepidemic strains. In the last 8 weeks of period II, no new acquisitions were demonstrated, and the cohort of possibly epiVRE patients was abolished. ). Throughout the study, com-P ! .05 pliance with screening and preemptive isolation was 100%.
Prevalence of VRE among patients visiting general practitioners. VRE isolates were detected in 12 (2% [95% CI, 1%-3.5%]) of 600 fecal samples obtained from nonhospitalized persons; all belonged to the cluster of nonepidemic isolates.
Annual use of alcohol-based hand rub. Annual use of alcohol-based hand rubs increased in all wards and differed considerably between wards (table 2). In the years before the VRE outbreak (1997-1999), hand rub use was !10 L/1000 patientdays on regular wards, 15-17 L/1000 patient-days on the hematology ward, 10-28 L/1000 patient-days on the neurosurgical medium-care ward, and 140 L/1000 patient-days in the MICU. Large increases in annual use were observed between 1999 and 2000 (period I started in June 2000) in the affected wards, ranging from a 31% increase in the MICU to a 275% increase in the NG ward. In the same period, annual use remained stable in 3 unaffected wards (the hematology, ophthalmology, and orthopedics wards). (table 3) . Restriction of these latter agents was not included in the infection-control program.
DISCUSSION
Although enterococci are considered relatively avirulent, considerable attributable morbidity and mortality due to VRE infections has been demonstrated for immunocompromised patients, such as those receiving dialysis, those treated in ICUs, or those who undergo bone marrow and solid-organ transplantation [17, 18] . At the onset of the outbreak in our hospital, it was apparent that VRE had spread predominantly among these populations. With the anticipation that VRE endemicity will eventually lead to infections, implementation of infectioncontrol measures was deemed necessary. Initially, the prevalence of VRE colonization among the high-risk population was 14.8%, with 93% of isolates belonging to an epidemic type. At that time, there was no evidence that these epidemic genotypes had different epidemiological characteristics. Further analyses, however, demonstrated that PFGE cluster I belongs to a clonal complex of E. faecium associated with VRE outbreaks on 5 continents [16, 19, 20] .
Our infection-control strategy was based on the Dutch "search and destroy" policy for methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus [21] and on the Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee guidelines for VRE [22] . Important differences, however, between methicillin-resistant S. aureus and VRE are the existence of a community reservoir of VRE and the inability to eradicate VRE colonization. In the period of our outbreak (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) , prevalence of nonepidemic VRE was ∼3% and 2% among hospitalized and nonhospitalized subjects, respectively.
Because it was not feasible to monitor hand-hygiene compliance prospectively, detailed data on annual use of alcoholbased hand rubs per ward were used as a process indicator. Substantial increases in use were seen, especially for affected wards, which is attributable to the enforcement of infectioncontrol measures. Gradually increased use in nonaffected wards might be attributable to awareness of ongoing infection-control problems in other wards. Few data are available on the amount of alcohol-based hand rub solution used in other settings. Pittet et al. [23] reported an improvement in compliance with hand hygiene in their hospitalwide program, with annual amounts increasing from 3.5 to 15.4 L/1000 patient-days (with no distinction between individual wards), which suggests that regular wards in our hospital appear to have had use levels higher than hospitalwide baseline levels in the Geneva study. In our setting, use in affected wards sharply increased in 2000 and stabilized, or even decreased, thereafter. However, because outbreak control was achieved in the beginning of 2001, it seems unlikely that increased use of alcohol-based hand rubs was the only effective control measure.
In retrospect, the outbreak can be divided into 4 periods on the basis of modifications of our infection-control strategy. We fully acknowledge that this is a suboptimal design for scientific analysis and has potential for bias. Yet, in the face of an ongoing epidemic, it was not deemed appropriate to postpone implementation of control measures until the results of more-robust techniques, such as a case-control study, would be available. In period I (4 months), there were 14 episodes of temporarily discontinuing patient admissions in 6 different wards. The cumulative number of days during which wards were closed for new admissions was 133. However, the detection rates of patients colonized with the epidemic strain did not reduce in period I. Importantly, some patients became colonized with the epidemic VRE strain even after у3 cultures, combined with enrichment broth, had negative test results. In theory, these patients might have acquired colonization from external sources [24, 25] . However, they were not treated in the proximity of other colonized patients or in rooms where patients colonized with the epidemic VRE strain had been treated previously. Moreover, such rooms were extensively disinfected after discharge of patients, the time period during which these cases occurred was 30 months, and environmental screening failed to identify a source of contamination. For all these reasons, a persistent environmental source of VRE was deemed highly unlikely.
An essential difference in traditional control strategies for multidrug-resistant bacteria is the restriction of control measures to patients with epidemic strains. Because of this policy, isolation precautions were withheld for 76 (54%) of 140 VREpositive patients in the affected wards. For the hospital at large, this number would have been considerably higher, because 2%-3% of all admitted patients were colonized with nonepidemic VRE strains. These patients were not labeled as VRE-positive patients, and it is therefore unlikely that they were approached more carefully than uncolonized patients by health care workers. Yet, awareness of a hospitalwide outbreak and implementation of targeted barrier precautions may influence health care workers' behavior, which might be reflected in gradually increasing annual use of alcohol-based hand rubs in nonaffected wards. Obviously, molecular genotyping will only be useful in settings where a distinction between epidemic and nonepidemic strains can be made.
A diagnostic test to distinguish epidemic from nonepidemic strains is a prerequisite for a genotyping-targeted approach. PFGE analysis has been regarded as the gold standard for studying nosocomial outbreaks, mainly because of its high degree of differentiation between isolates [26, 27] . However, PFGE is a labor-intensive procedure with considerable intertest variation. Multiple-locus variable-number-of-tandem-repeat analysis might be an attractive alternative for molecular epidemiological studies [28] . Initially, epidemic strains could not be identified by a specific antibiogram (data not shown). However, with increasing experience, it appeared that coresistance to ampicillin and ciprofloxacin and susceptibility to tetracycline were common features of cluster I isolates.
Infection-control measures, especially those implemented during outbreaks, are seldom evaluated in a study with a controlled design [29] . The present study is likewise a descriptive analysis. In our case, the initial approach of contact isolation for identified cases, the cohorting of patients with different exposure risks, and the improved hand-disinfection practice probably reduced spread but failed to control the outbreak. Effects of different antibiotic exposures can be neglected because a reduction in vancomycin use was not achieved and a reduction in cephalosporin use was not pursued. In our setting, spread of epidemic VRE was contained after the addition of preemptive isolation of high-risk patients. These findings suggest that hand hygiene and preemptive isolation of patients at high-risk for colonization are important measures in the control of antibiotic resistance in hospitals with low levels of resistance. Prospective studies evaluating this concept are needed also in settings with high prevalence levels of resistance. Until that time, we recommend this strategy.
